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I. EFFORTS AND TRIALS PRIOR TO WWI.
The history of attempts to create international criminal tribunals for prosecution of international crimes includes attention to the responsibility of heads
of state, other public officials, and private persons for violations of treaties and
customary international law and, thus, nonimmunity of heads of state and other
governmental actors. One of the early prosecutions of a public official for an
international crime occurred in a domestic tribunal in Naples in 1268 when
Conradin von Hohenstafen, Duke of Suabia, was tried for initiating an unjust
war or what we term an offense against peace or war of aggression. Von
Hohenstafen was later executed for his misdeeds on October 29, 1268.'
In 1474, the Burgundian Peter von Hagenbach, who served as Governor
of territory under Duke Charles of Burgundy, was tried before what can be
termed an international tribunal for the oppression of persons under his charge
and for actions against the "laws of God and man," including responsibility for
murder, rape and pillage. 2 The trial of von Hagenbach for the improper administration of pledged territories on the Upper Rhine had occurred at Breisach at
the order of the Archduke of Austria and was presided over by twenty-eight
judges from allied towns. It should also be noted that von Hagenbach was tried
before actual war in 1476, so it would not be proper to label the case a normal
"war crimes" trial. He raised a defense of obedience to superior orders and
asked for adjournment to obtain confirmation of such orders, but the defense
was denied as being contrary to the law of God.
1.

See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 621

(2d ed. 2000).
2.
Id. at 622.
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More generally during the Middle Ages, the Holy Roman Emperor failed
to obtain sufficient authority to enforce the law of arms. Such application occurred in the councils and courts of the major sovereigns in Europe. Further, the
Papacy had attempted to establish a right to hear claims concerning violations
of the law of arms, but to no avail.3
During the U.S. Revolutionary War, there were suggestions that the King
of England and others be prosecuted for their "War against the natural rights of
all Mankind," 4 but there had been no capture of the King of England by the
Americans and no such trials took place. Although the British war against
human rights and crimes of political oppression led to no criminal sanctions, in
view of the trial of von Hagenbach an international trial would not have been
completely unprecedented.
One of the early recognitions of criminal responsibility of a head of state
occurred at the Congress at Aix-La-Chapelle in 1818 when the Congress, without formal trial, found Napoleon guilty of waging wars against peace.5 After his
capture in 1815, he had been banished to the Island of St. Helena where he died
some six years later.
During the 1915 massacres of Armenians by Turks, the governments of
Great Britain, France, and Russia had condemned the massacres as "crimes
against humanity,"' 6 but none of the alleged perpetrators were captured abroad
and subject to trial in domestic or international fora.
II. THE 1919 PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE AND REPORT
After Word War I, there was an important Report of the Commission on
the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties
that was presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference in Paris on March 29,
1919.' Members of the 1919 Commission were: the United States, the British
Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Romania, and Serbia.
The Report identified then current opiniojurisconcerning "responsibility of the
authors of the war"; responsibility for breaches of neutrality (another form of
offenses against peace); responsibility for war crimes, including a list of customary crimes under the laws of war'; responsibility for offenses against "the
laws of humanity" (what we term crimes against humanity, which were

3.
4.

Id. at 622.
Id. at 621-22.

5.

See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, JOAN M. FITZPATRICK & JON M. VAN DYKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW

AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 874 (2000).
6.
See, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, Er AL., supra note 1, at 857.
7.

See, e.g., PAUST, FrIT.ZPATRICK & VAN DYKE, supra note 5, at 874. Here, I quote and borrow

extensively from the 1919 Report, as reproduced in our casebook.
8.

See, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 1, at 32-33.
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recognizable crimes under international law prior to creation of the Charters of
the IMTs at Nuremberg and for the Far East); and nonimmunity for heads of
state and other public officials (which every 20th Century Charter and Statute
with respect to international criminal tribunals has adopted, e.g., those for the
IMTN, IMTFE, ICTY, ICTR, and ICC).
Importantly, the Report stated a "desire to state expressly that in the
hierarchy of persons in authority, there is no reason why rank, however exalted,
should in any circumstances protect the holder of it from responsibility when
that responsibility has been established before a properly constituted tribunal.
This extends even to the case of heads of states. An argument has been raised
to the contrary based upon the alleged immunity, and in particular the alleged
inviolability, of a sovereign of a state. But this privilege, where it is recognized,
is one of practical expedience in municipal law, and is not fundamental. However, even if, in some countries, a sovereign is exempt from being prosecuted
in a national court of his own country the position from an international point
of view is quite different.
"We have later on in our Report proposed the establishment of a high
tribunal composed of judges drawn from many nations, and included the possibility of the trial before that tribunal of a former head of state with the consent
of that state itself secured by articles in the Treaty of Peace. If the immunity of
a sovereign is claimed to extend beyond the limits above stated, it would
involve laying down the principle that the greatest outrages against the laws and
customs of war and the laws of humanity, if proved against him, could in no
circumstances be punished. Such a conclusion would shock the conscience of
civilized mankind.
"In view of the grave charges which may be preferred against-to take one
case-the ex-Kaiser-the vindication of the principles of the laws and customs
of war and the laws of humanity which have been violated would be incomplete
if he were not brought to trial and if other offenders less highly placed were
punished. Moreover, the trial of the offenders might be seriously prejudiced if
they attempted and were able to plead the superior orders of a sovereign against
whom no steps had been or were being taken.
"There is little doubt that the ex-Kaiser and others in high authority were
cognizant of and could at least have mitigated the barbarities committed during
the course of the war. A word from them would have brought about a different
method in the action of their subordinates on land, at sea and in the air.
"We desire to say that civil and military authorities cannot be relieved from
responsibility by the mere fact that a higher authority might have been convicted
of the same offence. It will be for the court to decide whether a plea of superior
orders is sufficient to acquit the person charged from responsibility.

210

ILSA Journal of International& ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 10:207

1H. CONCLUSION

"All persons belonging to enemy countries, however high their position
may have been, without distinctionof rank, including Chiefs ofStates, who have
been guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war or the laws of
humanity, are liable to criminalprosecution...."9
However, with respect to an international criminal tribunal, the Report
opined:
"Any tribunal appropriate to deal with the other offences to
which reference is made [e.g., war crimes and crimes against humanity] might hardly be a good court to discuss and deal decisively with
such a subject as the authorship of the war. The proceedings and discussions, charges and counter-charges, if adequately and dispassionately examined, might consume much time, and the result might conceivably confuse the simpler issues into which the tribunal will be
charged to inquire. While this prolonged investigation was proceeding some witnesses might disappear, the recollection of others would
become fainter and less trustworthy, offenders might escape, and the
moral effect of tardily imposed punishment would be much less salutary than if punishment were inflicted while the memory of the wrongs
done was still fresh and the demand for punishment was insistent.
"We therefore do not advise that the acts which provoked the
war should be charged against their authors and made the subject of
proceedings before a tribunal."'"
The Report added that "acts which brought about the war should not be
charged against their authors or made the subject of proceedings before a tribunal," but that the Conference should condemn them and "it would be right...
even to create a special organ in order to deal as they deserve with the authors
of such acts."" Kaiser William H had fled to the Netherlands and was not
surrendered for prosecution. No international criminal tribunals were established; but there were several, yet insufficient, domestic prosecutions of persons
for war crimes in Germany during the Leipzig Trials of 1921 (involving prosecution of twelve and the conviction of six persons-including a civilian; a pri12
vate; a sergeant; various lieutenants, captains and majors; and three generals).
There were also prosecutions of various persons in the United States and in
other countries. 3

9.
10.

Reproduced in PAUST, FITZPATRICK & VAN DYKE, supra note 5, at 878-79.
Id. at 879.

11.

Id. at 880.
See, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 1,at 623-24.

12.
13.

See, e.g., id. at 278-87.
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It should not be forgotten, however, that later that year, on June 28, 1919,
the Treaty of Versailles (or Treaty of Peace) with Germany was created and as
Article 227 declared:
The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of
Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.
A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby
assuring him the guarantees essential to the right of defence. It will
be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the following
were: namely the United States of America, Great Britain, France,
Italy and Japan ...
The Allied and Associated Powers will address a request to the
Government of the Netherlands for the surrender to them of the exEmperor in order that he may be put on trial. 4
The treaty also proclaimed in Article 228 that "[t]he German Government
recognizes the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring before
military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the
laws and customs of war. Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to
punishments laid down by law. This provision will apply notwithstanding any
proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Germany or in the territory of
her allies," adding: "The German Government shall hand over to the Allied and
Associated Powers, or to such one of them as shall so request, all persons
accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and customs of war,
who are specified either by name or by the rank, office or employment which
they held under the German authorities."' 5
German accused were not surrendered, but both the 1919 Report of the
Commission on Responsibility and the 1919 Treaty of Versailles demonstrate
significant pre-Nuremberg expectations of the international community concerning individual responsibility and nonimmunity for crimes against peace, war
crimes, and offenses against the laws of humanity. These patterns of expectation had historical support with respect to trials and condemnations of von
Hohenstafen (1268), von Hagenbach (1474), and Napoleon (1818), among
others, and in the claims of our Founders concerning offenses against the law
of nations allegedly committed by the King of England and his entourage.

14.
15.

Reproduced in PAUST, FITZPATRICK & VAN DYKE, supra note 5, at 880-81.
See id.
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Prior to Nuremberg, there had also been many domestic prosecutions for
war crimes and breaches of neutrality, especially within the United States.
Within the U.S., there had even been recognitions in the Supreme Court when
war ships were not immune with respect to breaches of the law of nations that
if a Prince "comes personally within our limits, although he generally enjoy a
personal immunity, he may become liable to judicial process in the same way,
and under the same circumstances, as the public ships of the nation."' 6 Similar
expectations of nonimmunity for heads of state were demonstrated in an 1859
Opinion of the Attorney General: "A sovereign who tramples upon the public
law of the world cannot excuse himself by pointing to a provision of his own
municipal code."' 7 Even earlier, Vattel had written in his widely read book in
1758, that "[t]he Prince...who would in his transports of fury take away the life
of an innocent person, divests himself of his character, and is no longer to be
18
considered in any other light than that of an unjust and outrageous enemy.
In 1625, Grotius had also recognized that sovereignty is limited by and all kings
are bound to observe the law of nations 9 and that a war against an oppressive
ruler was a permissible sanction who violated "the right of all human society"
to freedom from oppression.2 ° Other early U.S. cases had also recognized that
commissions from foreign governments do not create any immunity with
respect violations of international law. 2 1 Further, universal jurisdiction over
violations of international law was recognized early in U.S. cases, 22 as well as
the duty of all states to prosecute customary international crimes.23
Was there precedent for the prosecutions at the IMT at Nuremberg, the
IMT for the Far East, and the tens of thousands of convictions in military
commissions under Control Council Law No. 10 in occupied territory after
World War HI? I believe there was significant, if somewhat sparse, precedent
16.
See, e.g., The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 350-55 (1822); see also Berg v.
British and African Steam Navigation Co., 243 U.S. 124, 153-56 (1917) (nonimmunity of German
Government concerning civil claims).
17.

9 Op. Att'y Gen. 356, 357 (1859).

18.

E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations, book II, sec. 213 (1758), quoted in United States v. Wilder,

28 F. Cas. 601, 604 (C.C.D. Mass. 1838) (No. 16,694) (Story, J.).

19.
HuGo GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, bk. I, chpt. 3, § 16 (1625).
20.
Id. bk. I1,
chpt. 25, §8.
21.
See, e.g., United States v. Furlong (The Pirates), 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 201-02 (1820); The
Estrella, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 298, 299-301, 304, 307-09 (1819); L'Invincible, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 238, 257-58
(1816).
22.
See, e.g., JORDAN J.PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAw OFTHE UNITED STATEs 421-22(2 ed.
2003), and the many cases cited. A prominent example was Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 159-61 (1795)
("all ...
trespasses committed against the general law of nations, are enquirable, and may be proceeded against,
in any nation....") (emphasis added).
23.

See, e.g., id. at 421-22, 443-46, and numerous references cited.
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for individual responsibility for crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity and for nonimmunity for international crimes.24

24.
Of particular interest with respect to violations of customary international law is the express
recognition of nonimmunity by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: "The principle of
international law, which under certain circumstances protects the representatives of a state, cannot be applied
to acts which are condemned as criminal by international law. The authors of these acts cannot shelter
themselves behind their official position... [and one] cannot claim immunity while acting in pursuance of the
authority of the State if the State in authorizing action moves outside its competence under international law."
Opinion and Judgment, I.M.T. at Nuremberg (1946).

